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INTRODUCTION
The theme of this Conference points to the importance
of Cryogenics in the future; for that future to be
assured however it is vital that the interests of safety
should receive the closest attention.
Accidents arising in the early use of a new method are
especially important for, if they attract adverse
criticism from Health & Safety Authorities, this can
jeopardise completely the future use of the method leading
to the loss of what might otherwise have been a commercially
attractive possibility. Safety in existing cryogenic processes
is of course equally important.
Fortunately the Cryogenics Industry, largely because it was
conceived and developed by scientists and engineers, has
a good safety record but, due to the complexity of the
technology it employs, the wide variety of fields it
embraces and the ever increasing involvement of the public
as product usage expands, accidents, many of which could
have been avoided, are still occurring. The dissemination
of safety information on Cryogenics in a readily digestible
form is therefore vital at this point in time.
In the UK the British Cryogenics Council set up a panel of
experts having considerable scientific and practical
experience to examine cryogenic safety in a fully compre-
hensive way. The findings of this group have been published
as a revision of the Cryogenics Safety Manual which was
published by the BCC over 10 years ago and was felt to need
updating. It is hoped that this book which covers:
1 General Safety Pequirements
2 Oxygen, Nitrogen and Argon
3 LNG, Ethylene and Ethane
4 Hydrogen
5 Helium and Neon
will lead to a fuller understanding of the problems that
can arise in Cryogenics and to better all-round safety in
this field.
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In the present talk I wish to highlight some general
aspects of Cryogenic Safety and to draw attention to some
of the more unusual hazard situations which may well be
new even to people who have worked in cryogenics for quite
some time.
HAZARD AVOIDANCE - GENERAL
Safety specialists often have a tendency to concentrate
their efforts on particular aspects of safety, whilst
neglecting the vitally important broader areas which are
a prerequisite of good safety. Briefly, these can be said
to cover:
(a) Hardware - this must be properly designed
and suitable for its purpose
(b) Mode of Operation - a well designed plant may fail
if it is not operated properly
(c) Maintenance - plants will not remain safe if
they are not adequately
maintained
(d) Organisation - must be adequate to control (a")
(b) and (c)
It is perhaps on (d) that there has been the greatest neglect,
although Managements are becoming increasingly aware of the
importance of this area. It is, for instance, pointless to
devote time and effort to producing a rule book if there is
no system for ensuring that the rules are being observed.
Better by far to have fewer rules coupled with a mechanism
to ensure that the rules are adhered to. A rule book filled
with outdated and unnecessary rules will not earn the respect
of workers and can therefore itself be regarded as a hazard.
Managements tend to devote effort only to the creation of new
rules, whereas it is equally important from the safety view-
point to devote effort to the elimination of old outdated
rules.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAFETY AND CRYOGENIC FLUID PROPERTIES
An awareness of the physical properties of the cryogenic
fluids being dealt with is important in directing attention
to haanrd eituationa which may arise. For this reason the
flAfoty Manual starts by listing the more important
properties such na molecular weiaht, boiling point and
f+*~*4ut* ^vMia, '4'ak.tmj a quick look at some of these, let
us see some of the things we can deduce. ««se, xet
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(a) Molecular Weight OF POCR CL'/
Hydrogen
Helium
Oxygen
Nitrogen
Ethane
Argon
Krypton
Xenon
2
4
32
28
30
40
84
131
Air
Hydrogen and helium are very light and will clearly
rise in air at normal temperature.
This knowledge, coupled with the fact that hydrogen
readily forms explosive mixtures with air, means we
must be on the alert for dangerous situations at
high points in buildings in the event of a hydrogen
leak. Also, it is no good trying to vent the gas
at low level.
Argon is unexpectedly heavy and will be difficult to
disperse from low lying badly ventilated areas. Its
removal from enclosed spaces will be better achieved
by suction than by blowing.
AIR
SUCTION
(b) Boiling Points and Freezing Points
Oxygen
Nitrogen
Argon
Hydrogen
Helium
Boiling Point
°C
-183
-196
-186
-253
-269
Air
Freezing Point
-219
-210
-189
-259
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The boiling points in this slide show us the order
of condensation of a number of different cryogenic
fluids as temperature is reduced.
Air, which is a mixture of oxygen and nitrogen, will
clearly condense if exposed to liquid nitrogen, thus
the use of inert liquid nitrogen can lead to the
creation of a non-inert atmosphere which supports
combustion because it contains oxygen. This is why
we prefer to use non-combustible insulant in vessels
containing liquid nitrogen.
Designers sometimes forget that cryogenic gases can
freeze. From the slide it can be seen that the
boiling points of hydrogen and helium are so low that
they will cause all other gases to freeze leading to
possible plant blockages and in the case of hydrogen
to the even greater hazard of solid oxygen formation.
The fact that the boiling point of argon is separated
from the freezing point by only 3°C has led to the
downfall of many a plant designer.
The Boiling Point slide also reminds us that very low
temperatures are involved in cryogenic equipment and
this dictates the metals of construction we can use.
Embrittlement forces us to think in terms of stainless
steel, aluminium and bronze. Incidentally, there is
one area where low temperature assists the designer,
namely, the increase in tensile strength which it
produces. In the case of stainless steel, for instance,
the tensile strength is doubled at low temperature
providing a useful safety margin over room temperature
predictions.
These very low temperatures are also going to involve
problems of contraction of plant and the packing of
insulant, if this is in the form of powder, making
repeated warm-up for inspection undesirable and even
hazardous.
Also, it should be remembered that a joint which is
leak-tight at room temperature may well not be leak-
tight at low temperature.
.
(c) Volume Ratio Gas/Liquid QF POOR Q '
Oxygen 843
Nitrogen 683
Helium 740
Hydrogen 833
Neon 1415
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The volume ratio gas/liquid on vaporisation of most
cryogenic fluids lies between 600 and 800. Neon
is exceptional in having a ratio of 1415.
(d) Liquid Density
Density at Normal
Boiling Point
(Kg/Cu M)
Hydrogen 71
Helium 125
Nitrogen 808
Oxygen 1138
Xenon 3040
The considerable density difference between hydrogen/
helium and oxygen/nitrogen should warn us not to use
hydrogen/helium dewars for storing oxygen/nitrogen as
the vessels may well be incapable of standing the extra
weight. The situation is aggravated by the fact that
hydrogen and helium vessels have to be designed to
give maximum protection against heat inleak; consequently
their support systems tend to be relatively fragile.
From the few examples, it can be seen that the worker who
takes the trouble to know something of the properties of the
various cryogenic fluids he has to deal with will already
have travelled a considerable distance along the road to
safety. There are however many hidden dangers which are not
always so easy to spot. These are dealt with in considerable
detail in the revised Manual and I am certain that few people
will read it without learning something new. I would like
now to consider some of the unexpected hazards, most of which
have led to deaths in the past.
PHYSIOLOGICAL
(a) Asphyxiation (Anoxia)
The increased use of inert gas during recent years
. has unfortunately not been matched by an increased
awareness of the danger that can arise due to these
gases being asphyxiants. This has led to many deaths.
A lack of awareness of this hazard even by people who
have enjoyed the highest levels of scientific training
ts confirmed by the deaths which have occurred in the
atomic energy and research fields, and in the chemical
industry.
- 6 -
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Anoxia is of course lack of oxygen. Many people QUALITY
have an erroneous view of the time taken for lack
of oxygen to have an effect on human beings. This
is derived largely from films and the like about
what happens in the case of submarine disasters
with the victims gasping for breath for long periods.
Rising carbon dioxide concentration in a submarine
makes the victims breathe harder and this partly
compensates for the lack of oxygen. In most industrial
situations when oxygen shortage arises there is no
increase in carbon dioxide concentration to warn the
body to breathe harder and there is no gasping for
breath. If oxygen is totally cut off, as could happen
when breathing pure nitrogen or argon (or LNG or
hydrogen for that natter), the victim goes down without
warning as if struck on the head with a hammer and in
a few minutes he will be dead.
The next slide which falls into the category of
'having a quick look1 shows one manifestation of this
type of accident where a man who knew nitrogen to be
unbreathable decided to have a quick look in a tank
which had been purged with nitrogen. He stuck his
head in the tank, took one breath and was later found
dead with the torch still alight in the bottom of
the tank. Incidentally, it was wrongly assumed by
the first investigators of this incident that the man
had dropped the torch and bent down to get it. It is
much more likeV that he dropped the torch after first
becoming unconscious.
Of
Another slide entitled 'Come up if you are short of
breath' depicts how a worker in the atomic energy
field was told by a senior scientist to climb down
into a vessel known to contain some argon. The man
entered and was later found dead.
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Another slide shows how the introduction of a hood
to reduce noise can sometimes lead to a hazardous
atmosphere due to the gradual leakage of inert gas
from a compressor gland.
ACOUSTIC HOOD
LEAK
1 I
NITROGEN
COMPRESSOR
A particularly insidious aspect of asphyxiation
accidents is that rescuers can all too easily
themselves become victims. What is often forgotten
is how difficult it is, even with ropes, to extract
an unconscious man from an enclosed space such as a
tank. A rescuer finding he cannot pull the man out
will often rush in to lift the man out and himself
become a victim.
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(b) Frostbite and Hypothermia
Many workers know little about frostbite and those
who do have some knowledge have usually gained it
as a result of the bitter experience of having
been frostbitten through contact with cold products
or metal.
Naked flesh will of course stick to uninsulated
pipes cooled to very low temperatures. This is a
truly terrifying experience. The worst example I
have come across is when a small child gained access
to a vacuum insulated oxygen evaporator (VIE) and
stuck its tongue on the air heated vaporiser from
which it was licking the snow.
The anaesthetising action of cold makes workers
careless about getting treatment for frozen limbs
and the actions to be taken in the event of frostbite
are points on which people are remarkably ill-
informed.
Hypothermia is thought by many to be the concern of
only the aged. Entry of even a relatively young
person into deeply chilled vessels or tanks with
inadequate clothing can lead to the person losing
the strength of his limbs before he becomes aware
of what is happening. The danger is greatest in
summertime when people are wearing light clothing.
Incidentally, if a man is sent to hospital with anoxia,
frostbite or hypothermia, it is vital to advise the hospital
what is the matter otherwise valuable time may be lost
trying to diagnose the trouble and, likely as not, the
diagnosis will be wrong and the victim will be treated for
something he does not have.
TECHNOLOGICAL
(a) Nitrogen Explosion Hazards
At first sight readers may think this heading is
incorrect, but this is not so.
As we saw earlier on, the condensation of air at
liquid nitrogen temperature can lead to the formation
of an oxygen-rich liquid and in contact with
combustibles this can result in the formation of
what amounts to an explosive.
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(b)
PAGE ?s
OF POOR QUALITY
Another way in which nitrogen can cause explosions
is by the deoxidation of lubricants and surfaces
in compressors handling nitrogen, leading to the
formation of pyrophoric material. The sudden
exposure of such machines to air can lead to violent
explosions.
Combustion
There is often a lot of confusion over materials
which burn and those which support combustion.
Hydrogen and hydrocarbons burn - oxygen supports
combustion.
The slide shows what happens when an LNG tank leak
catches fire. The whole area is engulfed in flame
and anyone unfortunate enough to be in the spill
area will be burned. The fireball is likely to
damage the tank and this can lead to the further
escape of product. In other words we can rapidly
find ourselves having to deal with a very serious
situation.
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In contrast/ consider an oxygen escape. Here one
man who lights a cigarette goes up in flames, but
there is no fire spread, other workers in the area
are not affected and neither is the tank. We have
a situation which, although very unpleasant for the
individual lighting the cigarette, will be most
unlikely to result in widespread damage.
*
When combustible gases and liquids escape into the
atmosphere they will automatically find oxygen and
all that is needed for disaster is a trigger. Much
time is often wasted after incidents in argument as
to what this trigger was - spark, friction, static
electricity or naked flame. Such arguments, whilst
interesting, are not likely to lead to measures
which will prevent such incidents in the future,
for in the case of hydrogen or hydrocarbon escape
it is better to work on the premise that whenever
a spill or an escape occurs a trigger capable of
causing ignition is almost certain to arise. This
greatly increases the emphasis on spill avoidance
and leads to improved safety.
(c) Analytical
Certain combustible gas detectors rely on the presence
of oxygen in the gas being sampled. If there is no
oxygen present these instruments can give a false
indication of safety.
It should also be remembered that instruments designed
for operation at room temperature may not function
properly at low temperature.
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(d) Total Vaporisation
It is often imagined that because a product such
as liquid oxygen at a particular point in a plant
contains a very low concentration of flammable
impurity, no danger can arise. Workers forget
that if product is totally vaporised certain
impurities are liable to be deposited as solid
which, if vaporisation continues, can build up to
dangerous concentrations. A slide shows how this
can arise in the case of the incorrect installation
of an oxygen withdrawal line from a storage tank.
A lute should be installed to prevent the vaporisation
of liquid against the valve which is -warm.
- LIQUID :-
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(A) (B)
(e) Cold Migration
It is often forgotten that even with good insulation
cold can find its way from cryogenic plants and tanks
into the ground unless there is a positive heat
barrier between the cold part and the ground.
For this reason tanks are usually put on stilts to
make sure that the air gap between the tank and the
ground will prevent the transmission of cold to the
ground.
Insulation by itself is not enough, as can be seen
from the example which shows a huge concrete plinth
cracked by the cold emanating from a liquid nitrogen
pipe embedded in it and insulated from it. As there
was no heat break to the atmosphere a temperature
gradient established itself in the concrete leading
to the crack and in this case to a hazardous situation
and great financial loss because the plinth was
supporting an atomic accelerator designed to the
highest of tolerances.
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CRACK
INSULATION
These are but a few of the topics dealt with in the
British Cryogenics Council Cryogenics Safety Manual
and in the book many other facets of Cryogenic Safety
covering the fluids listed in the introduction have
been considered.
It is hoped that the publication will help to bring
about increased safety in the production and use of
Cryogenic products through a deeper appreciation of
the scientific, technological and administrative steps
which must be taken if accidents are to be avoided
in future.
